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Abstract 
 
This article examines recent and potential reforms in India’s fiscal federal system.  We 
summarize key federal institutions in India, including tax and expenditure assignments, 
and mechanisms for Center-state transfers.  We discuss the institutional process by which 
reforms can and do take place, including the role of academics, political influences, and 
especially institutions such as the Finance Commission.  In contrast to the past, recent 
commissions have played a greater role in articulating an agenda for fiscal federal reform, 
which then proceeds through political bargaining.  This change has taken place in the 
context of, and been influenced by, broader economic reform in India. 
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The Political Economy of India’s Fiscal Federal System and its Reform 
 
 
 Economic reform, where the term is typically used to indicate a reconsideration of 
boundaries between state action and market forces, has been a significant feature of the 
world economy since the 1980s, spurred by the success of many East Asian economies, 
and by the collapse of the Soviet Union. Many of the large countries grappling with 
economic reform include, unsurprisingly, those with federal systems of various kinds, 
e.g., Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Russia, and South Africa. It is natural that there 
would be special challenges for implementing change in countries with multiple layers of 
political authority and divided sovereignty. There are difficulties in intergovernmental 
bargaining that result from federal structures, as well as the greater complexity and range 
of institutions that must be considered for reform. Arguably (e.g., Wibbels, 2005), the 
literature on federalism has not sufficiently addressed the issue of reform in developing 
countries with federal structures. Nor has there been adequate attention to the political 
determinants of federal institutions, and how these shape the reform process (e.g., 
Wibbels, 2005; Rodden, 2006a). 
This article provides an analysis of India’s fiscal federal institutions in the context 
of that country’s economic reform.  It uses a political economy perspective on the 
working of India’s federal system to examine past reforms in the system of 
intergovernmental transfers, including the institutional process of these reforms.  The 
political feasibility of possible structural reforms in India’s fiscal federal institutions is 
discussed, using the examples of tax assignments, decentralization to local governments 
and a move toward market borrowing by state governments. India is an interesting 
candidate for study, because of its size, diversity and institutional complexity. While 
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every country has specific institutions, so that lessons from case studies must be  applied 
with caution, the discussion in this article may be seen as contributing to the broader 
research project of understanding the dynamics of federal systems, especially in 
developing countries (e.g., Wallack and Srinivasan, 2005). In particular, this article 
argues that reform of India’s fiscal federal institutions has been driven by greater regional 
political competition, and has proceeded by a combination of political agenda-setting, 
technocratic advice, and political bargaining, with new institutions created, and existing 
federal institutions being adapted to the new environment. 
 
FEDERAL INSTITUTIONS IN INDIA 
India is comprised of 28 states and seven “Union Territories” (including the National 
Capital Territory of Delhi).  All the states have elected legislatures and chief ministers in 
the executive role, though state governors exercise some powers.  Because many Indian 
states are quite large, with the largest dozen being comparable in population to larger 
European countries, devolution of powers to the states without any further 
decentralization below that level still represents a relatively centralized federation.  In 
practice, devolution to both the states and substate (local) government bodies was weak 
before the 1990s.  
The primary expression of statutory constitutional authority in India comes 
through directly elected parliamentary-style governments in the national and state arenas, 
as well as nascent directly elected government bodies in various local jurisdictions.  The 
rise of regional parties, and of explicit coalitions in the national Parliament, have together 
led to some decentralization in legislative governance.  Other dimensions of governance 
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structures that embody aspects of federalism include the bureaucracy and judiciary: both 
are relatively centralized.  
 What distinguishes federalism from general decentralization is the assignment of 
inextinguishable powers to subnational governments (Breton, 2000).  Assignments 
include important non-fiscal dimensions, but control over how public resources are raised 
and spent represents a crucial aspect of any federal system.  The Indian Constitution 
assigns the powers and functions of the Center and the states, in Union, State and 
Concurrent Lists.  All residuary powers are reserved to the Center.  The assignments are 
fairly typical of federal nations.  The functions of the central government relate to those 
of defense, those required to maintain macroeconomic stability, promote international 
trade and relations, exploitation of major minerals, and those having implications for 
more than one state.  The major subjects assigned to the states include public order, 
public health, and agriculture.  In practice, the states assume a significant role for subjects 
in the concurrent list, including education, transportation, and social insurance.  
The assignment of tax powers in India is based on a principle of separation, that 
is, tax categories are exclusively assigned either to the Center or to the states.  Most 
broad-based taxes have been assigned to the Center, including taxes on income and 
wealth from non-agricultural sources, corporation tax, taxes on production, and customs 
duties. A long list of taxes is assigned to the states.  However, only the tax on the sale of 
goods has been significant for state revenues.  The separation of income tax powers 
between the Center and states based on whether the source of income is agriculture or not 
has opened up avenues for evasion of the personal income tax.  Also, although taxes on 
production (central excises) and sale (state sales taxes) are separate, they tax the same 
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base, historically causing cascading of rates and effectively crowding out state taxes.  
Finally, the states have been allowed to levy taxes on the sale and purchase of goods but 
not services.  This has also led to tax evasion. 
The result of India’s assignments and implementation of tax and expenditure 
authorities has been a substantial vertical fiscal imbalance, with well over a third of state 
expenditures having to be covered by transfers from the Center. The Constitution 
recognized that its assignments would create imbalances – both vertical, among different 
levels of government, and horizontal, among different units within a sub-central level.  
Therefore, it originally provided for the sharing of revenues from certain centrally levied 
taxes (particularly the personal income tax) with the states, and grants to the states from 
the Consolidated Fund of India.  The tax shares of the Center and of each state are 
determined by the Finance Commission, which is appointed by the president of India 
every five years.  In addition, the Finance Commission is required to recommend grants 
to states as needed.  So far, twelve Finance Commissions have made recommendations, 
mostly accepted by the central government.  However, the functioning of these 
commissions has been criticized for being too restricted in scope, and for using 
methodologies for determining transfers that were deficient in their consequences for 
equity and incentives.1  More specifically, on the last point, the use of grants to fill 
revenue-expenditure gaps claimed by the states has created “soft budget constraints” for 
the states, and obvious disincentives to maintain fiscal discipline. 
A notable feature of India’s federal fiscal arrangements is the existence of 
multiple channels for Center-state transfers.  As noted, the Finance Commission decides 
on tax shares and makes grants.  Second, the Planning Commission, a central government 
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body created by an Act of Parliament, gives grants for implementing five-year 
(indicative) development plans.  Finally, various ministries give grants to their 
counterparts in the states for specified programs, either wholly funded by the Center 
(central sector projects) or requiring the states to share a proportion of the cost (centrally 
sponsored schemes). 
Historically, as development planning gained emphasis, the Planning Commission 
became a major dispenser of funds to the states.  Before 1969, plan transfers were 
project-based. Since then, a consensus formula decided by the National Development 
Council (NDC) has been used.2  Central ministries can influence states’ outlays on 
selected items of expenditure through specific-purpose transfers, with or without varying 
matching requirements.  These are nominally monitored by the Planning Commission.  
There are more than 200 such central sector and centrally sponsored schemes, and 
periodic attempts to consolidate them into broad sectoral programs have had limited 
success.  The current share of Finance Commission transfers in total transfers to the states 
is about 64%, with Planning Commission and ministry transfers making up roughly equal 
shares of the rest. 
 
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CENTER-STATE TRANSFERS 
We interpret the evolution of India’s institutions for Center-state transfers as follows.  
The Finance Commission was envisaged in the Constitution as the key institution 
responsible for dealing with fiscal imbalances between the Center and the states, as well 
as among the states.  Instead, its role has been circumscribed by the working of the 
Planning Commission, outside the Finance Commission’s terms of reference.  
 5
Furthermore, as Planning Commission transfers became formulaic, there was a tendency 
to move toward using discretionary grants determined by the central ministries.  Thus, the 
overall tendency seems to have been for the central government to try to exercise as 
much political control as possible over transfers to the states.  Also, within each channel 
for transfers, there is evidence that there are attempts to influence the outcomes of the 
process.3  Later in this article, we examine issues of how such influence effects might be 
moderated through institutional reform, in cases where they are believed to lead to 
inefficiencies, or failure to meet equity objectives in the transfer system.  We first 
summarize the theory and evidence for political-influence factors in the system of explicit 
intergovernmental transfers. 
In the large literature on the political economy of federalism, some analysts use 
bargaining models to focus on the formation and stability of the federation itself (e.g., 
Rao and Singh, 2002, and references therein).  An alternative branch of literature 
examines distribution and redistribution in the context of existing nations, without the 
threat of secession or breakup being considered.  Again, bargaining perspectives are 
important, with differing emphases on particular institutions, including legislative 
structures (e.g., Inman and Rubinfeld, 1997; Breton and Scott, 1978; Baron and Ferejohn, 
1989), voter ideological positions (e.g., Dixit and Londregan, 1998; Dasgupta, Dhillon 
and Dutta, 2001), and representation structures and intergovernmental transfer 
mechanisms (e.g., Kletzer and Singh, 1997, 2000).  
The theoretical models have been the basis for recent attempts to estimate 
political influences on Center-state transfers in India (e.g., Rao and Singh, 2002; Biswas 
and Marjit, 2000; Dasgupta, Dhillon and Dutta, 2001, Rao, 1979).  These models use 
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different categories of transfers (by state) as dependent variables, and measures of 
economic and political power as explanatory variables.  Examples of the political 
influence variables used in various studies include the ideological leanings of parties in 
power and the degree of political stability (Rao, 1979), the proportion of the ruling 
party’s members of Parliament (lower house only)4 coming from each state, the number 
of cabinet ministers from each state, a dummy variable measuring whether the same party 
was in power at the Center and in the state receiving the transfers, and a measure of the 
closeness of each state’s legislative assembly election.  The first two variables can be 
viewed as measuring “power,” the third as reflecting whether the state might “swing” in a 
favorable direction as a result of transfers, .and the last as capturing “alignment.”  On 
balance, the studies suggest the importance of political influence as measured above, as 
well as economic power, in affecting the observed pattern of Center-state transfers in 
India, and in directions generally consistent with the theoretical models.5  
In fact, the empirical analyses above were restricted to explicit transfers.  Political 
economy considerations can also work through a variety of additional channels.  Various 
types of controls and regulations, which are partly inherent in a planned development 
strategy and were partly introduced to meet the exigencies of a scarcity ridden economy 
in the 1950s, alter regional resource allocation from what would have been determined by 
the market.  The Center’s regional policies and own investments have also determined 
resource flows across India’s states.  Often, these implicit resource transfers (as opposed 
to explicit transfers made through various channels) were unintended, as in the case of 
India’s freight-equalization scheme.6  Financial repression, allocation of loans at below 
market rates of interest to states, mandated allocation of loans at below market interest 
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rates to priority sectors, and an origin based tax system and inter-state tax exportation 
have also resulted in significant implicit transfers with differential regional impacts (Rao, 
2000a).  Political economy factors can also manifest themselves in the design of the tax 
system at the state level, with regional implications.  In particular, origin-based sales 
taxes levied by the states have caused significant interstate tax exportation. 
The recent empirical findings on the political economy of Center-state transfers 
are of greater importance in the context of other empirical work that suggests that 
regional inequality in India has been growing (e.g., Cashin and Sahay, 1996; Nagaraj, 
Varoudakis and Veganzones, 1998; Rao, Shand and Kalirajan, 1999), and that political 
economy factors can dampen equalization across states through intergovernmental 
transfers (Rao and Singh, 2002).  Furthermore, increases in the potential for greater 
disparities across states, as a result of market-oriented reforms, put more of the burden on 
an effective system of Center-state transfers.  This suggests a greater focus on possible 
reforms in the transfer system.  An example of how the process of institutional reform 
can work comes from the case of tax-sharing arrangements.  As noted earlier, the 
Constitution originally specified certain categories of centrally collected taxes that were 
to be shared with the states, including personal income taxes and excise duties, but not 
any surcharges, or corporate taxes.  Over time, personal income taxes became the major 
component of tax transfers from the Center to the states, which received 87.5 percent of 
income tax revenues.  Unsurprisingly, the Center began to rely increasingly on somewhat 
ad hoc income tax surcharges, which were not shared. 
To correct this and other distortions of the tax structure that seemed to flow from 
the sharing arrangement,7 in 1994 the Tenth Finance Commission recommended an 
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alternative, in which a proportion, initially set at 29 percent, of aggregate central tax 
revenues were be devolved to the states.  This proposal required bargaining and 
agreement among the Center and the states, as well as a constitutional amendment, but 
this was all accomplished by 2000. Several aspects of this process bear noting. The 
sequence of reform began with academic proposals that crystallized in the specific 
recommendation of the Finance Commission, which itself consists of senior 
policymakers and politicians, advised by academic economists. The next stage involved 
political bargaining through the Inter-State Council (ISC), which is a closed-door 
discussion forum that has the Prime Minister, state Chief Ministers, and several central 
cabinet ministers as members.  Once this stage was completed, legislative 
implementation was relatively routine.  This is characteristic of India: logrolling and 
consensus building take place outside the formal legislative arena, but within well-
understood institutional parameters  
Another feature of this case is worth noting. The reform affected tax sharing 
between the Center on the one hand, and the states in aggregate on the other.  This meant 
that it was relatively easy to calibrate the new sharing system in a way that left the overall 
shares of the Center and the states in aggregate near their previous values, avoiding the 
problem of creating an immediate loser from the reform. To achieve such neutrality in 
changing the formula by which the states’ share is divided among them would obviously 
be a much harder exercise, though not impossible.  This bargaining perspective of 
feasible reform in India’s federal system is useful for considering other potential reforms 
of India’s intergovernmental transfer system. 
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One issue is that of revising the formula used to determine each state’s share of 
the tax revenue devolved from the Center.  This formula involves a complex balancing of 
multiple objectives, and does not give a clear sense of overall impact on interstate 
(horizontal) equity or on incentives for fiscal prudence (see Table 1).  The table indicates, 
through the example of the last two Finance Commissions, how precedent is respected in 
this formula, with relatively minor conceptual adjustments being made by each new 
commission.8 The approach illustrated here, of combining disparate concerns, such as 
equity, efficiency and incentive provision, through a weighting scheme for partial 
measures of these concerns, is quite different from the normative framework that emerges 
from the economic theory of public finances in the Musgrave tradition (e.g., Musgrave, 
1959; Boadway and Flatters, 1982).  Interestingly, practice in Australia and Canada, two 
other federations with a British colonial history, is closer to the economists’ perspective, 
and formed the basis for a detailed comparison with India by two members of the Twelfth 
Finance Commission (Rangarajan and Srivastava, 2004a, b).  Although this comparison 
led to no substantive changes in the horizontal sharing formula decided by the 
Commission, it may serve the purpose of “agenda setting” for policy recommendations 
and political bargaining, leading to eventual reform in this direction. 
The issue of ad hoc grants by the Finance Commission also bears consideration. 
While grants made beyond the formula-determined shares may be necessitated by 
extraordinary circumstances such as natural disasters, their routine use to fill claimed 
expenditure-revenue gaps undermines the states’ incentives for fiscal prudence.  The 
Eleventh Finance Commission, making recommendations for the years 2000-05, reversed 
the practice, started by the Ninth Finance Commission,9 of keeping a portion of shareable 
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tax revenues from Union excise duties exclusively for allocation among states according 
to their estimated post-tax-devolution deficits.  As we have argued above, an approach 
that incorporates equity concerns into a formula is preferable to one in which such “gap-
filling” grants are made at the margin.  However, the latest Finance Commission reduced 
horizontal equalization weights in the formula, and increased the use of various grants.  
Thus, there is no clear trend in practice on the treatment of grants and their incentive 
consequences. 
A case for reform of transfer formulae also exists for Planning Commission 
transfers calculated on the basis of the NDC’s consensus formula (Table 2).  It can be 
seen that the Planning Commission formula is similar in construction to that of the 
Finance Commission, and the same critique is possible. In principle, Planning 
Commission transfers are for “developmental purposes,” including project-specific 
expenditures – this is a very different rationale from general revenue sharing. In practice, 
because of fungibility and outright diversion, these transfers have increasingly been used 
for general expenditure needs, such as salaries and administration.  Moving away from 
previous practice, and more in line with constitutional intent, the last two Finance 
Commissions were asked to consider India’s overall fiscal position.  In this context, both 
commissions criticized the conceptualization and implementation of plan transfers.10 The 
Eleventh Finance Commission specifically recommended a reassessment of plan-transfer 
formulae, with this task to be brought within the scope of the Finance Commission.  
Thus, this reform has also been put on the policy agenda, where political debate will now 
occur. However, unlike the case of changing the Finance Commission transfer formula, 
this raises a control issue between two components of the government. In the past, the 
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Planning Commission, a permanent body, has had greater clout than the more tenuously 
composed Finance Commission. 11
 
REFORM OF INDIA’S FISCAL FEDERAL INSTITUTIONS 
The success of the change in tax-sharing arrangements (sharing all taxes, rather than just 
a few, between the Center and the states) suggests that reform of India’s fiscal federal 
system is politically feasible and implementable within India’s existing institutional 
framework.  However, reforming the formulaic aspects of India’s system of Center-state 
transfers is a relatively narrow, and therefore easier, proposition than other kinds of 
institutional reform.  Nevertheless, there is evidence that broader reforms are also 
politically feasible.  Here we discuss three important aspects of broader institutional 
reform: tax assignments, decentralization to local governments, and changes in financing 
methods for state governments’ capital expenditure. 
Tax Reform 
Tax reform has been proceeding on many fronts since the 1980s – with added 
impetus from the economic reforms of the 1990s – including reductions in tariff rates, 
reductions in direct tax rates coupled with attempts to broaden the tax base, and a gradual 
movement from excise duties and sales taxes to a VAT by both the central and state 
governments.  Comparing 1990-1991 with 2002-2003, the central direct-tax-to-GDP ratio 
increased from 2.2 percent to 3.7 percent (accompanied by a tripling in the number of tax 
filers from about 6 to 18 million), but this was more than offset by a decrease in the 
central indirect-tax-to-GDP ratio from 7.9 percent to 5.3 percent, driven by reductions in 
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the percentages of central excise duties as well as customs duties.12  State sales taxes and 
excise duties have also shown some decline, so that the overall tax-GDP ratio declined by 
almost two percentage points during the 1990s (Rao, 2000b).  The fact that this occurred 
at higher income levels, which would normally support a higher ratio, and that a 
significant portion of the decline was in domestic indirect taxes in addition to customs 
duty raises questions about long-term implications.  These issues are connected to 
dimensions of tax reform that have yet to be tackled effectively. 
The Tax Reform Committee of 1991 had recommended minimizing exemptions 
and concessions, simplifying laws and procedures, developing modern, computerized 
information systems, and improving administration and enforcement.13  Subsequent 
committees (known as the Kelkar committees, after their chair), echoed and amplified 
these recommendations. However, there has been little progress to date on any except the 
first of these areas.   
Reforms that more directly affect India’s federal system pertain to indirect taxes, 
which, as noted, did not increase proportionately with GDP in the last decade.  Evolving 
a coordinated consumption-tax system remains a major challenge.  In the context of 
problems with the current assignments of indirect taxes, Rao (2000b) provided detailed 
recommendations with respect to issues such as rates, interstate sales taxes, and tax 
administration for a dual VAT coordinated between the Center and the states, and noted 
the problem created by the failure of the Constitution to explicitly include services within 
the scope of states’ sales tax authority.14  Moving taxation of services from the Union 
list, where it implicitly lay through the Center’s residual powers over taxes not explicitly 
specified in the Constitution, would have been one option.  Instead, the central 
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government chose to explicitly add service taxes to the Union List, via an amendment to 
the Constitution, passed in January 2004, but still to be enacted.  Service taxes are to be 
shared with the states, in a manner yet to be determined, and outside the common pool 
that is allocated by the Finance Commission.  It is possible that the sharing of service 
taxes will be completely outside the Commission’s scope in the future, representing a 
reversal of previous measures to simplify the tax-sharing system and make it more 
efficient. 
One can obviously understand this move as an attempt by the Center to increase 
its own revenues. It is still possible, however, to incorporate political economy 
considerations: the Center could give up its power to the states, in exchange for their 
agreement to reduce and eventually eliminate taxation of interstate sales.  This would 
remove some of the internal barriers that have prevented the development of a true 
national market within India. It would also smooth the implementation of a destination-
based VAT for the states, which in turn could also reduce tax exporting by the richer 
states (Rao and Singh, 2005, Chapter 7).  While considerable recent progress has been 
made in moving toward a comprehensive VAT, many states have yet to implement this 
reform. 
The issue of taxation of services illustrates a broader issue addressed by the 
Eleventh Finance Commission.  Its report recommended, without giving any specifics, a 
reduction in the vertical fiscal imbalance by giving the states more power to tax.  This 
approach takes some pressure off the fiscal transfer system, allowing states that can 
obtain political support to tax their own constituents in a more flexible manner, in order 
to deliver benefits to them.  An example of such a tax reassignment would be to allow 
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states to piggyback on central income taxes.  Any such reform would also require a 
constitutional amendment.  Piggybacking could give states more flexibility at the margin, 
adjusting their own tax rates as needed, somewhat independently of tax-sharing 
allocations.  States are already assigned the right to tax agricultural income, but their 
current use of this tax is minimal.  This separation has no economic justification, and, as 
noted earlier, promotes tax evasion.  Piggybacking could be combined with a removal of 
the distinction between nonagricultural and agricultural income.  This would broaden the 
direct tax base, giving the states a flexible new tax in return for giving up the 
distortionary and ineffective agricultural income tax. 
To summarize, while some tax reform measures can be initiated by the Center 
acting alone, many others require agreement or coordination between the Center and the 
states.  These include possible reassignments of tax authority, as well as changes in tax 
administration. Recognizing the play of differing interests may help in devising reform 
packages that balance potential losses against gains, and thereby increase the probability 
of acceptance. 
Local Government Reform 
The political motivations and history of local government reform in India have 
been quite different from those that led to the country’s economic reforms of the 1990s. 
Nevertheless, there is a complementarity between the two sets of reforms.  After a long 
history of debate on decentralization, a central government committee recommended that 
local bodies be given constitutional status.  This was accomplished through constitutional 
amendments in 1993.  These amendments required individual states to pass appropriate 
legislation because local government remained a state subject under the Constitution; and 
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all states complied.  It has been suggested that the Center pushed through this reform to 
reduce the power of state governments,15 but this may have only been one factor, with 
genuine sentiment for “democratic decentralization” playing an important role.  In any 
case, states have often been reluctant to devolve authority and revenue to the local level. 
A key change brought about by the amendments was a reduction of state 
government discretion concerning elections to rural local government bodies.  Direct 
elections to local bodies must now be held every five years. This reform replaces 
“hierarchy” with “voice” as the primary accountability mechanism for local government, 
potentially improving that accountability.16  Local government reform also has changed 
the nature of tax and expenditure assignments to local governments, and instituted a 
system of formal state-local transfers by State Finance Commissions (SFCs), modeled on 
the central Finance Commission. 
One view has been that formal transfers from the Center and states to local 
governments have the potential to accentuate fiscal deficit problems.17  However, local 
government finances, particularly for urban bodies, steadily worsened over the period 
before local government reform, under supposedly strict monitoring by state 
governments.18 Thus, the formal, rule-governed system now in place may simply have 
made existing problems more transparent.  However, the SFCs have struggled to 
formulate principles for sharing or assigning state taxes, tolls, and fees and for making 
grants-in-aid (Finance Commission, 2000, Paragraph 8.11b).  This reflects inexperience, 
but also reluctance on the part of state governments to devolve revenue in this manner.  
Current assignments of tax authority to the various tiers of rural local government leave 
them in a weak position, with effectively no fiscal autonomy (World Bank, 2004). In 
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some cases, state governments have failed to implement their own SFC reports. Instead, 
states have asked the central Finance Commission to provide them with additional grants 
to supplement their own transfers to local governments.  The last two commissions have 
been reluctant to do so, noting that the constitutional amendments do not justify this 
softening of the states’ budget constraints in this manner. 
The recent Finance Commissions’ main recommendations with respect to local 
government have related to assignment and incentive issues for enhancing revenue.  Land 
and profession taxes, as well as local user charges, were identified as possible sources of 
revenue enhancement.  Perhaps the most promising is the recommendation of surcharges 
on state taxes earmarked for local government, similar to the piggybacking on central 
taxes that was proposed for the states earlier in this paper.  These recommendations are 
conceptually straightforward; being based on economic principles of minimizing 
allocational distortions.  The real issues arise in defining details and achieving 
implementation.  State governments, acting on SFC recommendations, have to formulate 
and agree on such changes.  The fiscal weakness of local governments, which these 
reforms would remedy, puts them in a poor bargaining position to push for change.  By 
contrast, in the case of the central Finance Commission, the bargaining power of the 
states and the role of precedent have worked to ensure the implementation of most 
recommendations.  In the case of local governments, they may need help from the courts 
to pressure reluctant state governments. 
One factor that may aid the case for local governments to receive more revenue 
authority is if they can show they are more efficient than the state government at 
spending the money.  This goes back to the idea that local governments may be more 
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accountable.  The Eleventh Finance Commission suggested a quicker transfer of 
expenditure responsibilities to local governments; to give them this opportunity, with 
interim grants to provide initial resources, in the absence of adequate state-local transfers.  
The commission also recommended grants for improved accounting, auditing, and 
database building for local governments.  These grants are meant to flow directly to local 
governments, rather than supplementing the states’ own transfers.  However, there are 
also potential conflicts between the existing institutional apparatus of central ministry 
schemes, and the role envisaged for local governments. 
Finally, there is a parallel between the nature of past regulation of local 
governments in India and the previous approach to economic policy, which relied on the 
case-by-case discretion of government decision-makers.  Ideas that are guiding changes 
in how the national government interacts with the private sector are also important for 
how state governments interact with local governments.  The expanded assignments 
legislated for local governments, and the increased role for local “voice,” together require 
the state governments to fundamentally change their regulation of local governments 
underneath them.  Expanding the scope of the central Finance Commission in 
determining Center-state transfers, while reforming the principles it uses, can have the 
added benefit of giving states a clearer road in achieving this change, with more effective 
devolution to local governments.  Also, central ministry transfers, often meant to be 
implemented at the local level, swamp local government capacity for action and raising 
own-revenue (Rajaraman, 2001).  Replacing these program-specific transfers with 
conditional or unconditional grants could allow local governments to function more 
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effectively.  In this way, local government reform ties in with reform of the Center-state 
transfer system.19
Borrowing Reform 
Consideration of the overall fiscal position of India’s federal system was a 
significant part of the terms of reference for the last two Finance Commissions. This 
broadening of scope was motivated by the ongoing issue of fiscal deficits that India has 
struggled with for the past fifteen years.  Furthermore, the problem of fiscal deficits has, 
to a large extent, been pushed down to the state governments, making it very much an 
issue of federalism.  Fiscal deficits in the states have increased despite the central 
government’s apparent formal authority to strictly control state borrowing.  The Center 
has partly enabled the increase in deficits by using discretionary loans, often with interest 
subsidies or even ex post conversion of loans to grants, as a way of exercising or 
responding to political influence (Rao, 2000a).  Making things worse than the budget 
numbers indicate, the states have used public sector enterprises and other off-budget 
devices to run even larger “true” deficits (Rao, 2000c; Mohan, 2001). 
The ultimate enabler of India’s continued fiscal deficits has been the nature of its 
financial system.  Financial repression, along with direct ownership and control of much 
of the financial system, has permitted the central government to “park” deficits in the 
financial system, avoiding the need to print money and cause politically dangerous 
inflation.  State governments have been able to tap postal savings,20 and to borrow from 
nationalized banks, which are required to hold state government bonds.  From this 
perspective, the larger solution is to free the financial sector from its de facto captive role 
as a holder of government debt.  Even in the absence of major financial sector 
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privatization, reform is proceeding toward new mechanisms that will allow state 
governments to borrow to finance capital expenditure, without undermining incentives to 
use those funds effectively. 
The Eleventh Finance Commission recommended a slew of measures to promote 
fiscal discipline, including an overall ceiling of 37.5 percent of gross receipts of the 
Center for all transfers to the states; hard budget constraints for all levels of government 
with respect to wages and salaries; “greater autonomy along with hard budget constraints 
for public sector enterprises;” more explicit controls on debt levels for state governments; 
deficit-reduction-linked grants to states and improvements in budgeting, auditing, and 
control.21  However, goals such as “greater autonomy along with hard budget constraints 
for public sector enterprises” may be impossible in practice due to political pressures.  
The Twelfth Finance Commission went considerably further in its recommendations, 
detailing an approach to reducing the central government’s role as a lender to the states 
by replacing it with market borrowing, as a way to harden the states’ budget constraints. 
This would apply to several channels of central loans, including those through the 
Planning Commission and central ministries. The Reserve Bank of India is exploring the 
development of institutions to support this shift to market borrowing, including offering 
mechanisms, secondary markets for government debt, credit ratings, and methods of 
regulation and monitoring.  Therefore, the case of reforming financing states’ capital 
expenditure through new borrowing mechanisms involves building on reforms already 
taking place in the financial sector.  The Finance Commission’s role over the last decade 
has thus come to include recommending major institutional reforms that transcend a 
narrow determination of intergovernmental transfers.  Note that hardening state budget 
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constraints in this dimension must be paralleled by reforms that achieve the same goal for 
other transfers, as argued in the previous section. 
 
CONCLUSION 
This article has provided an analysis of India’s fiscal federal institutions in the context of 
that country’s economic reform.  It has suggested that recent reforms of India’s fiscal 
federal institutions have been driven by greater regional political competition, and have 
proceeded by a combination of political agenda-setting, technocratic advice, and political 
bargaining, with new institutions created, and existing federal institutions being adapted, 
in a climate of overall economic reform. In particular, the Finance Commission, which 
has existed since the 1950s, has played a greatly expanded role in the last fifteen years. 
The Inter-State Council, created in 1990, has provided a forum for political bargaining 
with respect to federal reform issues. A third tier of local governments has been given 
constitutional status in the 1990s. In this evolving institutional framework, tax reform, 
decentralization to local governments and institutions governing subnational borrowing 
have been significant areas of fiscal federal reform processes. Thus, one can be argue that 
politically feasible reforms in India’s federal system are possible, and the institutional 
process by which they occur can be identified.   
The analysis of the Indian case suggests several aspects of reform for that country.  
One possibility is that the system of Center-state transfers be simplified, and that the 
Finance Commission be given a greater role in governing these explicit transfers. 
Another is that tax reforms can include some realignment of tax assignments to remove 
anomalies and to reduce the extent of vertical transfers.  In these cases, there are some 
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possibilities for creating politically feasible policy reform packages.  This article also 
assessed some aspects of local government reform and discussed how reforms of the 
Center-state transfer system, and of the Planning Commission’s role, could aid the 
effectiveness of local governments.  Finally, the discussion of Center-state transfers to 
was related to the issue of financing states’ capital expenditure through more effective 
borrowing mechanisms.  
One final country-specific point is that understanding India’s federal system is a 
vital part of conceptualizing economic reform in India.  Shifting the boundary of 
ownership between state and market is just one aspect of reform.  Another dimension 
involves altering the nature of regulation of the market, moving from case-by-case 
permission and input control to arm’s length regulation and performance-based 
monitoring.  Various kinds of decentralization and delegation, which involve changing 
the nature of the powers of and interactions among the different levels of government, 
constitute the third, often most neglected dimension of reform. 
India’s size, diversity and institutional complexity increase the difficulty of 
applying lessons from any case study to broader contexts. Nevertheless, the analysis in 
this article, by tracing aspects of the specific institutional process of reform in various 
fiscal federal institutions, may be seen as a contribution to understanding the dynamics of 
federal systems in developing countries, and to modeling the endogeneity of federal 
institutions (e.g., Rodden, 2006b).  
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 Table 1: Criteria and Relative Weights for Tax Devolution 
Criterion Weight (%) 
11th Finance Commission 
Weight (%) 
12th Finance Commission 
1.  Population (1971 Census) 10 25 
2.  Income (Distance Method)* 62.5 50 
3.  Area 7.5 10 
4.  Index of Infrastructure 7.5 0 
5.  Tax Effort** 5.0 7.5 
6.  Fiscal Discipline*** 7.5 7.5 
 
Notes: *The distance method share is given by:  (Yh-Yi)Pi/Σ(Yh-Yi)Pi   where Yi and Yh represent per capita 
SDP of the ith and the highest income State respectively and Pi is the population of the ith State. Most 
recently, the average of the three richest states has been used for Yh, with positive values being used for 
those states rather than zero, based on a notional “distance” value. 
** Tax Effort (η) is estimated as (η) = (Ti / Yi) / (0.5 1/Yi) where, Ti is the per capita tax revenue collected 
by the ith State and Yi is the per capita State domestic product of the ith State. 
*** Estimated as the improvement in the ratio of own revenue of a state to its revenue expenditures divided 
by a similar ratio for all States averaged for the period 1966-99 over 1991-1993. 
Source: Rao and Singh (2005), Twelfth Finance Commission Report (Finance Commission, 2004) 
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 Table 2: Planning Commission Formula for Distributing State Plan Assistance  
 
Criteria Distribution weights 
non-special category states 
 
     1.   Population (1971) 
     2.  Per capita income, of which 
           (a) According to the ‘deviation’ method covering 
only the States with per capita income below 
the national average 
           (b)  According to the `distance' method covering 
all the non-special category states 
                 
     3. Fiscal performance, 
           of which 
           (a)  Tax effort  
           (b)  Fiscal management 
           (c)  National objectives 
 
      4. Special problems 
 
Total             
 
60.0 
25.0 
 
20.0 
 
5.0 
 
 
7.5 
 
2.5 
2.5 
2.5 
 
7.5 
 
100.0 
 
Notes:  Non-special category states are all the major states, excluding northern and northeastern border and 
mountainous states. 
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Endnotes 
                                                 
1 See Rao and Singh (2005) for more institutional detail and a discussion of these issues, 
as well as statistics quoted here. 
2 The NDC is chaired by the Prime Minister and its members include all cabinet ministers 
at the Center, Chief Ministers of the states, and members of the Planning Commission. 
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3 See, for example, Rudolph and Rudolph (2001).  In a different example, while the 
Finance Commission uses objective formulae to determine tax sharing, it also makes 
grants, and it has been suggested that states that are represented in the membership of the 
commission do relatively well in terms of such awards. 
4 The lower house of the Indian parliament is the only directly elected national 
legislature, and it is where legislative power resides almost exclusively. The upper house 
is indirectly elected, and is not powerless, but is quite limited in its role. 
5 In fact, Rao and Singh (2002) showed that these effects extended to Finance 
Commission transfers as well as to more obviously discretionary transfers. 
6 This was designed to equalize the factory prices of basic inputs throughout the country 
by differentially subsidizing transportation of minerals. Thus, it favored industrialized 
states like Maharashtra over natural resource-abundant states like Bihar. 
7 Academics were the first to point out these distortions. See, for example, Burgess and 
Stern (1993). 
8 As the changes in the percentages in Table 1 illustrate, changes within the conceptual 
framework may be large. Based on calculations presented in Rao and Jena, 2005, the 
result of the formula change by itself was a 16.5 percent decrease in Maharashtra’s share, 
and 6-12 percent declines for the three other richest of the major states. Transfers for all 
the other major states were affected by less than 5 percent by the changes in weights. In 
most cases, the changes in weights counter-balanced changes that resulted from 
movements in the component variables, suggesting that stability in shares may have been 
an implicit goal of the changes in weights.  Giving more weight to “Area” benefited the 
small (mostly mountainous, special category border) states substantially, illustrating the 
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sensitivity of the system to the diversity. We are grateful  to a referee for emphasizing the 
latter point.  
9 This was in the main report, covering the years 1990-95. Earlier, the Ninth Commission 
had, as asked, made recommendations for the single year, 1989-90: thus, exceptionally, 
its recommendations covered six years rather than five. 
10 A more radical suggestion is to do away with the Planning Commission altogether.  
Where there is a justification for national coordination because of externalities that cross 
state borders (e.g., roads and power), different ministries or state governments can 
negotiate and cooperate.  Where there is no such justification, unconditional grants, 
determined by the Finance Commission, would be appropriate.  While such radical 
reform is highly unlikely, there is considerable debate on the Planning Commission’s role 
in a more market-oriented economy (e.g., Singh and Srinivasan, 2005)  
11 It has been suggested that the Finance Commission could be more effective if provided 
with ongoing resources for conducting its analyses and making recommendations. Both 
the last two commissions argue strongly for this. See also Rao and Singh (2005). 
12 These figures are derived from Reserve Bank of India (2003), Table 4.6. Direct taxes 
refer to taxes such as personal and corporate income taxes, which are paid directly by 
those who owe them, whereas, indirect taxes refer to, for example, sales and excise taxes, 
which are collected by intermediaries from those who partially bear the tax burden. 
13 See Rao (2000a). Das-Gupta and Mookherjee (1998) detailed the problems with Indian 
tax administration, in terms of the incentives of both those paying taxes and those 
enforcing them. 
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14 This problem has been recognized for some time, and the Eleventh Finance 
Commission also recommended its correction (Finance Commission, 2000). 
15 Atul Kohli made this point to the first author at the conference "Indian National 
Economic Policy in an Era of Global Reform: An Assessment", at Cornell University, 
March 29-30, 1996. 
16 See Rao and Singh (2005), Chapter 13, for references and a more detailed discussion. 
17 An early expression of this concern was in World Bank (1995). 
18 See Rao and Singh (2003) for data and several examples. 
19 A recent study (World Bank, 2004) that focuses on two states in southern India 
(Karnataka and Kerala) discusses some of these ideas in more detail. 
20 Postal savings are gathered through India’s large network of post offices, and provide 
rural citizens, in particular, with a more accessible alternative to bank deposits. The 
central government allocates 80 percent of these savings to the state governments where 
the deposits are made, effectively giving those governments a major borrowing source. 
21 In a related development, the Center and several states have passed “fiscal 
responsibility” laws, but it remains to be seen how credible these legal commitments are, 
since penalties for noncompliance are ambiguous or nonexistent.  
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